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Contracts-ATTORNEY FEES-RIGHT TO RECOVERY UPON Dis-
CHARGE WITHOUT CAUsE-Rosenberg v. Levin, 7 Fla. L.W. 6 (1982).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Supreme Court, in Rosenberg v. Levin," resolved a
conflict created by recent decisions in the district courts concern-
ing the appropriate basis of compensation for an attorney dis-
charged without cause from a valid employment contract.? This
question required the court to grapple with the competing interests
of a client's right to discharge his attorney without cause8 and the
attorney's right to be adequately compensated for legal services
rendered.4 After one false start, the Rosenberg court held that an
attorney, discharged without cause after partial performance of a
valid contract, may recover only the reasonable value of his ser-
vices rendered prior to discharge, limited by the maximum con-
tract fee.5 The court further held that an attorney, engaged under
a contingency fee contract, may bring a claim for relief in quantum
meruit only upon the successful happening of the contingency.6
Other jurisdictions have balanced the competing interests in the
attorney-client relationship by formulating two distinct ap-
proaches: the contract rule and the quantum meruit rule.7 Under
the contract rule, a client's premature termination of the attorney-
client relationship is considered a breach of contract for which the
attorney is entitled to damages equal to the full contract price.8
1: 6 Fla. L.W. 388 (June 11, 1981), vacated, 7 Fla. L.W. 6 (Jan. 7, 1982).
2. The court cited the following cases as support for conflict jurisdiction: Milton Kelner,
P.A. v. 610 Lincoln Road, Inc., 328 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1976); Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 180 So.
538 (Fla. 1938); Levin v. Rosenberg, 372 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Sohn v.
Brockington, 371 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1202
(Fla. 1980).
3. The prevailing judicial attitude regarding the client's right to discharge was noted in
Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 410 N.E.2d 716 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980): "If it is bootless to make
an opera singer sing, it makes still less sense in a civil case to require a lawyer advocate and
a client take advice once they have had a falling out." Id. at 719 (citation omitted). See
generally F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 77-80 (1964); 1 S.
SPEISER, ATTORNEY'S FEES § 4:32 (1973).
4. See generally 5 A. CoRsIN, CONTRACTS § 1095 (2d ed. 1964 & Supp. 1980); 10 S. Wn.-
LISTON, CONTRACTS § 1285A (3d ed. 1967).
5. 7 Fla. L.W. at 6. The court's original decision did not limit the attorneys' quantum
meruit recovery to the contract fee. On rehearing, however, the majority of the court sup-
ported the limitation and the original decision on the merits was vacated.
6. Id. at 8.
7. Justice Overton attached these labels to the respective rules in Rosenberg. The quan-
tum meruit rule is also known as the modern rule.
8. See, e.g., Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 180 So. 538 (Fla. 1938) (fixed fee contract); Osius v.
Hastings, 97 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 104 So. 2d 21
(Fla. 1958) (contingent fee contract). See generally Annot. 54 A.L.R.2d 604, 609-16 (1957)
(noncontingent fee contracts); Annot. 136 A.L.R. 231, 245-51 (1942) (contingent fee
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The quantum meruit rule, however, does not consider the attor-
ney's discharge to be a breach of contract and limits the attorney's
recovery to the reasonable value of his services rendered up until
the time of discharge.9 Some jurisdictions allow the discharged at-
torney to elect whether to sue for breach of the contract or rescind
the agreement and recover in quantum meruit.10 In Rosenberg the
Florida Supreme Court resolved the issue in favor of the quantum
meruit rule and joined a significant number of jurisdictions" which
reject the contract approach. This note will examine the develop-
ment and current status of a Florida attorney's right to compensa-
tion upon discharge without cause and will analyze the limited
quantum meruit approach taken by the Rosenberg court.
II. THE CONTRACT RULE
Generally, the agreement between attorney and client concern-
ing fees is governed by ordinary contract principles."2 Based upon
this premise, the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Goodkind v.
Wolkowsky 5 followed the majority of jurisdictions which held that
an attorney, employed for a specified purpose and definite fee, who
has been discharged without cause after substantial performance,
could bring an action against his former client for breach of con-
tract. 4 The court also considered the contrat fee to be the appro-
contracts).
Some jurisdictions modify the application of the contract rule by calculating damages
equal to the full contract price less the expenses saved in not performing the balance of the
contract. E.g., Bockman v. Rorex, 208 S.W.2d 991 (Ark. 1948) (fixed fee contract); Anderson
v. Gailey, 606 P.2d 90 (Idaho 1980) (adopted the modified contract rule in a contingent fee
case as an alternative to the quantum meruit rule); LaBach v. Hampton, 585 S.W.2d 434
(Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (awarded damages equal to the full contract fee less the reasonable cost
of substitute counsel); Tonn v. Reuter, 95 N.W.2d 261 (Wis. 1959) (applied the modified
contract rule to a contingent fee contract).
9. E.g., Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916). See generally SPEisER, supra note 3 at
§ 4:28, :36; Annot. 92 A.L.R.3d 690 (1979).
10. E.g., French v. Cunningham, 49 N.E. 797 (Ind. 1898); In re Downs, 363 S.W.2d 679
(Mo. 1963); Mills v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 221 S.W. 1 (Mo. 1920); Howell v. Kelly, 534
S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
11. E.g., Fracasse v. Brent, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972); Rhoades v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,
399 N.E.2d 969 (I. 1979); Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916); Covington v. Rhodes,
247 S.E.2d 305 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978); cert. denied, 251 S.E.2d 468 (N.C. 1979); Chambliss,
Bahner & Crawford v. Luther, 531 S.W.2d 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975); Heinzman v. Fine,
Fine, Legum & Fine, 234 S.E.2d 282 (Va. 1977); Ramey v. Graves, 191 P. 801 (Wash. 1920).
12. Halstead v. Florence Citrus Growers Ass'n, 139 So. 132 (Fla. 1932); Reid v. Johnson,
106 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
13. 180 So. 538 (Fla. 1938).
14. Id. at 543. Goodkind actually involved a certified public accountant discharged with-
out cause. Since the accountant was employed to represent a taxpayer before the United
States Board of Tax Appeals and the same rules that would govern the employment of an
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priate measure of damages. 1'
The traditional justifications cited by the courts for the contract
rule acknowledge the unique nature of the attorney-client relation-
ship; yet these courts impliedly regard the right of an attorney to
contract for his services as paramount to the policy which permits
the client to sever the relationship at his discretion.1 At least five
justifications are advanced for the contract rule. The primary rea-
son for allowing an attorney to recover the stipulated contract fee
is the difficulty in determining the value of partially completed le-
gal work. 17 Second, since the attorney as an independent contrac-
tor' s is capable of contemporaneously performing legal services for
numerous clients, evidentiary problems in proving mitigation are
raised.19 Third, the full fee is considered the best measure of dam-
ages because it reflects the value the parties themselves placed on
the legal services to be performed.'0 Fourth, the attorney's duty to
avoid conflicts of interest and his obligation to forego employment
by the opposing party is an opportunity cost, validly considered in
calculating the appropriate rule of damages.21 Lastly, the courts
seem to apply the "bad man notion"' 22 which requires that the cli-
ent be responsible for the entire fee to prevent him from profiting
from his own breach.'8
Courts applying the contract rule implicitly assume that the in-
terests of the client are adequately protected by the client's ability
to discharge his attorney with cause.' The general rule is that an
attorney applied to the accountant, the supreme court based its decision upon an attorney-
client relationship. Id. at 540.
15. Id. at 543.
16. See Comment, Contingent Fee Contracts: Validity, Controls and Enforceability, 47
IOWA L. REv. 942, 960 (1962).
17. Note, An Attorney Discharged Without Cause Under a Contingent Fee Contract is
Limited to Quantum Meruit Recovery, and Recovery is Dependent Upon the Client's Ulti-
mate Recovery in the Underlying Action, 41 U. Cn4. L. Rav. 1002, 1004 (1972).
18. Note, Limiting the Wrongfully Discharged Attorney's Recovery to Quantum Me-
ruit-Fracasse v. Brent, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 772 (1973).
19. Id. at 779. But cf. Anderson v. Gailey, 606 P.2d 90 (Idaho 1980) (attorney wrongfully
discharged is entitled to recover the contract price, but has a duty to mitigate whether em-
ployed under a fixed or contingent fee contract).
20. 7 Fla. L.W. at 7.
21. See, e.g., Scheinesohn v. Lemonek, 95 N.E. 913, 916 (Ohio 1911); see also Note,
supra note 18, at 782.
22. See generally Childres & Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance In-
terest in Contract, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 433, 435 (1969). The "bad man notion" of the law of
contracts is the idea that the party who voluntarily fails to perform is a wrongdoer.
23. E.g., Dolph v. Speckart, 186 P. 32, 35 (Ore. 1920): "[A client] who has wrongfully
broken a contract should not be permitted to reap advantage from his own wrong .
See Note, supra note 17, at 1004.
24. But see Note, supra note 18, at 783-84.
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attorney discharged for good and sufficient cause is denied any
compensation, regardless of whether he was retained under a fixed
or contingent fee contract."5 This assumption, however, is insensi-
tive to the fact that conduct which is offensive to a client and in-
imical to a close attorney-client relationship may be insufficient to
constitute legal cause for discharge.2
Contract rule jurisdictions have consistently recognized the cli-
ent's "right" to dissolve the attorney-client relationship at any
time with or without cause2 7 This prerogative is based on the spe-
cial need for trust and confidence in the relationship between at-
torney and client.28 Although the client's power to discharge an at-
torney has been "[c]lothed in the vestments of an absolute right,"'
the contract rule renders this power impotent because of the cli-
ent's potential liability for the entire contract fee. The Florida Su-
preme Court in Goodkind noted that:
[T]his power . . .to terminate the attorney's authority must be
distinguished from the right to do so .... [Ilf the client has em-
ployed the attorney for a definite time, he has negatived his right
by the contract. While the client may still terminate the authority
of the attorney to represent him, he has breached his contract in
doing so, and must respond for the breach.30
In practice, the contract rule has often placed an onerous burden
on the client's power of discretionary discharge .3 Not only is the
client liable for breach of contract damages to the original attor-
ney, but in order to proceed with the action, the employment of
substitute counsel will be necessary. The client, fearful of liability
for the full amount of two contracts, is inhibited from terminating
25. F. B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES, 77-80 (1964).
26. E.g., Zurich Gen. Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Kinsler, 81 P.2d 913 (Cal. 1938)
(cause must not only be good, but legally sufficient for discharge); Warner v. Basten, 255
N.E.2d 72 (111. App. Ct. 1969) (attorney's discharge was without cause even though client
learned that attorney had represented opposing party in the past).
27. E.g., Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 180 So. 538 (Fla. 1938); see SPEISER, supra note 3, at
§§ 4:24, :29.
28. 180 So. at 541.
29. Note, Attorney Discharged Without Cause Under Contingency Fee Contract Enti-
tled Only to Quantum Meruit After Successful Settlement or Judgment-Fracasse v.
Brent, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 228, 232 (1972).
30. 180 So. at 542 (citing Annot. 1917F. L.R.A. at 407). See also Fracasse v. Brent, 100
Cal. Rptr. 385, 389 (1972) (citing 1 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 39 at 46 (2d ed. 1954).
31. This burden is most severe in personal injury cases. See, e.g., Jones v. Brown, 190
P.2d 956 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (Client paid 73 1/3 % of recovery in fees to attorneys);
Goldberg v. Perlmutter, 31 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941) (attorney who engaged in only
initial consultation with client awarded full contingency fee).
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the employment of an attorney in whom he has lost trust.8 2 Judi-
cial recognition of the "chilling effect" that this objective theory of
recovery has upon the client's right to discharge and the concomi-
tant damage it causes to the intimacy required in the attorney-
client relationship has been a catalyst for change.33
III. THE QUANTUM MERUIT RULE
In response to the contract rule's defects in theory and applica-
tion, a substantial number of jurisdictions"4 hold that an attorney,
retained under a contingent fee contract, who is discharged with-
out cause after partial performance, is denied recovery on the con-
tract. The attorney's remedy is limited" to compensation equal to
the reasonable value of his services rendered. This modern trend is
premised upon policy considerations which distinguish the attor-
ney-client contract from other employment agreements and justify
a departure from conventional contract principles." The genesis of
the quantum meruit rule can be traced to the New York Court of
Appeals decision in Martin v. Camp.8 7 In Martin, an assignee to a
law firm's interest in a contingency fee contract was limited to re-
covery measured by the reasonable value of the firm's services
rather than damages for breach of contract. The court considered
the client's right to terminate the relationship to be an implied
condition of the contract. Therefore, it followed as a corollary that
the client "[could not] be made liable in damages for doing that
32. 7 Fla. L.W. at 7.
33. In Salopek v. Schoemann, 124 P.2d 21 (Cal. 1942), Justice Gibson noted the Hob-
son's choice that confronts the dissatisfied client, and he issued a call for change from the
contract rule:
The right to discharge is of little value if the client must risk paying the full con-
tract price for services not rendered upon a determination by a court that the
discharge was without legal cause. The client may frequently be forced to choose
between continuing the employment of an attorney in whom he has lost faith, or
risking the payment of double contingent fees equal to the greater portion of any
amount eventually recovered .... Unless a rule is adopted allowing an attorney
as full compensation the reasonable value of services rendered to the time of dis-
charge, clients will often feel required to continue in their service attorneys in
whose integrity, judgment or capacity they have lost confidence.
Id. at 25 (Gibson, J., concurring).
34. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. See also Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Co.,
237 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (quantum meruit rule considered majority rule
when attorney wrongfully discharged from a contingent fee contract).
35. In most instances the reasonable value of an attorney's service will be less than dam-
ages for breach; however, this will not be the case in a losing contract situation. See infra
note 119 and accompanying text.
36. Note, supra note 18 at 780, 786-89.
37. 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916).
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which under the contract he has a right to do.""
Since the discharge of counsel without cause does not constitute
a breach of contract under Martin, the attorney's measure of re-
covery falls within the realm of restitution.3 ' The contract is re-
scinded upon discharge and the attorney is entitled to compensa-
tion based on quantum meruit.'0 In this context, a quantum meruit
determination is based upon the reasonable value of legal services
rendered and not the benefit to the client."1 Quantum meruit re-
covery is founded upon an implied assumpsit or promise by the
client to pay the attorney as much as he reasonably deserves.'"
The quantum meruit rule enhances the client's power to dis-
charge by using the fiction of an implied condition in the contract.
This term is a "constructive device used by the courts to effectuate
public policy without tarnishing the principles of freedom of con-
tract."4 3 Policy considerations require that singular treatment be
accorded the attorney-client relationship. Unlike other employ-
ment relationships, in the attorney-client relationship, a client
must rely almost exclusively upon an attorney's good faith, loyalty
and zeal to protect his legal rights.4 " This reliance necessitates
complete confidence in the integrity and ability of the attorney to
represent the client's best interests and is the foundation upon
which the right to discharge is based.4'
Since the "real value of a client's power to discharge is depen-
dent on what it costs him, 4 6 the quantum meruit rule's objective
is to minimize this cost and facilitate the termination of unsatis-
factory attorney-client relationships.4 7 The cases adopting the
38. Id. at 47-48.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 452 (1958); see generally Childres & Garamella,
supra note 22, at 437.
40. 114 N.E. at 48.
41. Heinzman v. Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, 234 S.E.2d at 286 n.4. In the context of
professional service contracts, confusion has resulted because the contract reliance interest
(restoration of the status quo) has developed under the guise of restitution (recovery of
benefits conferred), namely quantum meruit. Childres & Garamella, supra note 22 at 451-
54.
42. Sohn v. Brockington, 371 So. 2d 1089, 1094 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (citation
omitted). See generally Hazen v. Cobb, 117 So. 853, 857-59 (Fla. 1928) (explanation of the
historical development of general and special assumpsit).
43. Note, supra note 29, at 233-34.
44. Adams v. Fisher, 390 So. 2d 1248, 1250 n.1 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (citing
Fracasse v. Brent, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 389).
45. 7 Fla. L.W. at 8.
46. 6 Fla. L.W. at 388.
47. The distinction between the right to discharge and the power to discharge still exists
under the quantum meruit rule because the client remains accountable to the attorney for
the reasonable value of legal services, but presumably the client's exposure to liability is less
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quantum meruit rule assume that an unfettered right to dissolve
such relationships will promote public confidence in the legal pro-
fession' s and increase the efficiency of the adjudicatory process.'0
IV. FLORIDA CASE LAW
Florida has long recognized the delicate and confidential nature
of the attorney-client relationship 0 and its important role in the
efficient administration of justice. 1 The Florida Supreme Court
has repeatedly affirmed the power of the client to discharge his
attorney with or without cause.'2 Yet in Goodkind v. Wolkowsky"
the supreme court expressly declined the invitation to recognize
the client's power to discharge as an implied condition of the con-
tract and held the exercise of the power constituted a breach of the
agreement." In State ex rel. Branch v. Duval" the Third District
Court of Appeal acknowledged the line of authority in Florida
which recognized the client's right to discharge and even embraced
the New York position that this right was an implied term of the
attorney-client contract.'6 Yet the Branch court failed to adopt the
corollary implication that the client could not be liable for breach
in exercising an implied contractual right.57 For thirty-eight years,
Florida courts applied the contract rule to fixed fee and contin-
gency fee contracts, allowing attorneys to recover breach of con-
tract damages when discharged without cause."
It was not until the Florida Supreme Court's 1976 decision in
Milton Kelner, P.A. v. 610 Lincoln Road, Inc.,"9 that the continued
viability of the contract rule was threatened in Florida. Kelner was
than under the contract rule.
48. Baruch v. Giblin, 164 So. 831 (Fla. 1935). "The attorney's fee is, therefore, a very
important factor in the administration of justice, and if it is not determined with proper
relation to that fact it . . . undermines the confidence of the public in the bench and bar."
Id. at 833.
49. Note, supra note 18, at 785, 788-89.
50. 86 So. at 572.
51. 164 So. at 833.
52. State ex rel. Branch v. Duval, 249 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Brasch v.
Brasch, 109 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Osius v. Hastings, 97 So. 2d 623 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Harvey v. Rowe, 192 So. 878 (Fla. 1940); Carey v. Town of Gulfport,
191 So. 45 (Fla. 1939); Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 180 So. 538 (Fla. 1938); United States Say.
Bank v. Pittman, 86 So. 567 (Fla. 1920) (per curiam).
53. 180 So. 538.
54. Id. at 542-43.
55. 249 So. 2d 468.
56. Id. at 469.
57. Id. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
58. 6 Fla. L.W. at 389.
59. 328 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1976).
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engaged, pursuant to a contingency contract, by a robbery victim
to negotiate a settlement agreement with the client's insurer. Sub-
sequently, the insurer agreed to pay the face amount of the policy
and Kelner began to negotiate a distribution of the policy proceeds
in satisfaction of several consignors' claims. The client rejected the
consignors' settlement offer and terminated the attorney's employ-
ment without cause. The trial court approved the contract and the
jury returned a verdict in favor of the attorney equal to the full
contract fee." On appeal, the third district court determined that
the issue was whether an attorney discharged without cause from a
contingency fee contract should be permitted to recover under the
terms of the contract or be limited to quantum meruit recovery. 1
The court adopted the quantum meruit approach as the better rule
because of the peculiarity of attorney-client relationships." Recog-
nizing the import of its break with precedent supporting the con-
tract rule, the third district certified the question to the supreme
court as a matter of great public interest."
Regrettably, the supreme court was unable to resolve the issue
certified by the lower court. Since the maximum recovery under
the insurance policy had been obtained and the attorney was com-
pensated separately by the client in the consignors' actions, the
court determined that the happening of the contingency preceded
the attorney's discharge. Therefore, the issue of the appropriate
basis of an attorney's compensation in the event of a premature
discharge was not before the court." However, the supreme court
approved the district court's interpretation that the contract rule
of Goodkind65 was limited to fixed fee contracts and not persuasive
authority in the contingent fee context.6 In foretelling dicta, the
court signaled its willingness to reconsider the contract rule.67
60. Id. at 193-95.
61. 610 Lincoln Road, Inc. v. Milton Kelner, P.A., 289 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1974), rev'd, 328 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1976).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 15 n.2.
64. 328 So. 2d at 195-96. The supreme court found Fracasse v. Brent, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1972), to be distinguishable because the attorney in Fracasse was discharged prior to the
occurrence of the contingency. Id.
65. 180 So. 538 (Fla. 1938).
66. Kelner, 328 So. 2d at 196.
67. Id. The court stated:
Quantum meruit may well be the proper standard when the discharge under a
contingent fee contract occurs prior to the obtaining of the full settlement con-
tracted for under the attorney-client agreement, with the cause of action accruing
only upon the happening of the contingency to the benefit of the former client.
[Vol. 10:167
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In the recent case of Sohn v. Brockington," the First District
Court of Appeal addressed the unresolved issue in Kelner: the ap-
propriate standard for recovery for an attorney discharged from a
contingency contract after part performance, yet before the oc-
curence of the contingency. Seizing upon the supreme court's dicta
in Kelner, the Sohn court held that an attorney's exclusive remedy
for a client's premature termination of a contingent fee contract
was in quantum meruit.6 The first district court also suggested
that the attorney's cause of action for quantum meruit recovery
accrues upon discharge and is not limited by the fee stipulated in
the attorney-client contract.70 Although the Sohn court's rejection
of the contract rule was limited to contingent fee contracts, 1 the
policy justifications which support the enhancement of the client's
power to discharge in the contingent fee context apply with equal
force to situations where the attorney is retained for a specified
amount. These policies, coupled with the erosion of the contract
rule in the lower courts, persuaded the supreme court that the
time had come to reconsider its holding in Goodkind.
V. Rosenberg v. Levin
George Levin engaged attorneys Terrence E. Rosenberg and
Gerald Pomerantz to represent him in a multimillion dollar mort-
gage foreclosure action. The attorneys were to be paid according to
the terms of a letter agreement which provided for a $10,000 re-
tainer plus fifty percent of any recovery in excess of $600,000."'
Pomerantz and Rosenberg were discharged without cause prior to
settlement or judicial resolution of the case. Subsequently, Levin
employed substitute counsel and settled the matter for a net recov-
ery of $500,000. 73 The discharged attorneys filed an amended com-
plaint seeking payment of the $10,000 retainer, costs incurred, and
68. 371 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1202 (Fla.
1980). Attorney Sohn was employed by his client under the terms of a contingent fee con-
tract. The contract provided for a fee of 40% of any recovery received by the client. After
Sohn had successfully represented the client on her workman's compensation and personal
injury protections claims, but before he had filed a complaint in the tort action, he was
discharged without cause by the client. Id. at 1091.
69. Id. at 1091. The Sohn court went further than most modern trend jurisdictions and
held that quantum meruit should be the exclusive remedy whether the attorney's discharge
was with or without cause. Id.
70. Id. at 1094.
71. Id.
72. 7 Fla. L.W. 6 (Jan. 7, 1982).
73. Id. Levin actually received $675,000, but he relinquished $175,000 to other parties in
the settlement agreement. The trial court's final order indicated that Levin was only to
receive $500,000, 6 Fla. L.W. at 391 n.2.
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quantum meruit recovery in lieu of the contingency fee.",
The trial court held Levin responsible for the amount of the le-
gal services rendered under the quantum meruit theory and
awarded Pomerantz and Rosenberg $55,000. 75 The Third District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's reliance upon quantum
meruit, but held that it was error for the trial court to ignore the
written terms of the contract and in no event could the attorney's
recovery exceed the $10,000 retainer.7 6 The supreme court granted
certiorari to formulate the appropriate standard of recovery for an
attorney employed under a valid fee agreement when discharged
without cause by a dissatisfied client."
In the supreme court's original decision on the merits, Justice
England noted the difference between attorney-client contracts
and other employment agreements.7 8 He opined that the lawyer-
client relationship is the "cornerstone of our legal system"79 and
that the public's perception of the administration of justice is de-
pendent upon the collective trust and confidence which clients
place in their attorneys. 80 On rehearing, Justice Overton agreed
and recognized "an overriding need to allow clients freedom to
substitute attorneys without economic penalty as a means of ac-
complishing the broad objective of fostering public confidence in
the legal profession."81 This philosophy, tempered by a recognition
of an attorney's right to adequate compensation, convinced the
court that the quantum meruit rule should be applied in all pre-
mature discharge cases.8s The supreme court expressly receded
from Goodkind,85 and overturned forty years of adherence to the
74. Brief of Respondents on the Merits at 9, Rosenberg v. Levin, 7 Fla. L.W. 6 (Jan. 7,
1982).
75. 7 Fla. L.W. at 6.
76. 372 So. 2d at 958.
77. 7 Fla. L.W. at 6.
78. 6 Fla. L.W. 388 (June 11, 1982), vacated, 7 Fla. L.W. 6 (Jan. 8, 1982). Justice Eng-
land left the Florida Supreme Court in September 1981.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 7 Fla. L.W. at 8.
82. Id. The court's analysis applied to premature discharge under fixed and contingency
fee contracts, as well as "mixed fee" contracts which provide for both fixed and contingent
fees. Id. at 8. The quantum meruit rule adopted by the New York courts in Martin v. Camp,
114 N.E. 46, was limited to contingent fee contract, until In re Montgomery's Estate, 6
N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1936), extended its application to fixed fee agreements. California has not
yet applied the quantum meruit rule of Fracasse v. Brent, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385, beyond the
contingent fee situation. See also Note, supra note 29 at 242 (Suggesting that the Fracasse
holding is couched in broad enough terms to encompass fixed fee contracts).
83. 7 Fla. L.W. at 9.
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contract rule."4
The adoption of the quantum meruit rule required the court to
address two narrower issues: (1) Whether under a contingency con-
tract an attorney's cause of action accrues upon discharge or upon
the successful happening of the contingency and (2) whether the
maximum fee agreed upon and stipulated in the contract is a limi-
tation on an attorney's quantum meruit recovery. This latter issue
was the basis for a dissenting opinion authored by Justice Overton
which prompted the court to grant a petiton for rehearing and va-
cate its original decision on the merits.85
A. The Deferred Cause of Action
Jurisdictions which have rejected the contract rule and adopted
the quantum meruit approach have disagreed over the issue of
when the discharged attorney's cause of action for recovery in
quantum meruit accrues.86 Determination of this issue is important
because it establishes the attorney's first opportunity to seek com-
pensation and fixes the moment at which the statute of limitations
begins to run.87 The New York courts, for example, permit the at-
torney to choose between bringing an action in quantum meruit
immediately upon discharge or deferring the action until the un-
derlying litigation is resolved.8 8 California, however, precludes the
attorney from bringing an action for the reasonable value of his
services before the contingency stated in the contract occurs.89
The argument in favor of an immediate cause of action is pre-
mised on the notion that the client's termination of the contin-
gency agreement rescinds the terms of the contract. "[T]herefore
no contingency stated in the rescinded contract should govern the
84. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. The court was careful to note that its
decision did not disturb Kelner which permitted full recovery under completed contracts,
whether contingent, fixed fee, or mixed. 7 Fla. L.W. at 9.
85. 6 Fla. L.W. 388, 391-92 (Overton, J., dissenting), vacated, 7 Fla. L.W. 6 (Justice
Overton wrote the majority opinion).
86. Compare Tillman v. Komar, 181 N.E. 75 (N.Y. 1932) (immediate cause of action
upon discharge) with Fracasse v. Brent, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (cause of action deferred until
the happening of the contingency). See generally Note, supra note 29, at 235-39.
87. Note, Attorney-Client Relationship: Remedies of Attorneys Discharged Without
Cause in Contingent Fee Contract Situations, 37 AL3. L. REv. 364, 380 (1973); see Wright
v. Johanson, 233 P. 16 (Wash. 1925) (held cause of action accrued upon discharge, therefore,
the action was barred by the statute of limitations).
88. E.g., Paolillo v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (attorney may choose to take a percentage amount of recovery with the percentage to
be determined at an ancillary proceeding at the conclusion of the case); Adams v. Fort Plain
Bank, 36 N.Y. 255 (1867) (immediate cause of action recognized).
89. 100 Cal. Rptr. 385.
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right of the attorney to bring his action immediately following dis-
charge." 90 Because the contract "wholly stands or totally falls,'
the client is not permitted to disaffirm the contract, while selec-
tively enforcing its favorable provisions.'2 It is also argued that the
original attorney presumably entered into a contingency contract
apprised of the risk that the client would not recover, but he did
not contemplate his discharge or the possibility of being succeeded
by another attorney.93 Therefore, his contingent compensation
should not be measured by the "success or failure [of] some other
member of the bar."94
In Fracasse California's deferred cause of action was based upon
the perceived need to know the result obtained and the amount
involved in order to determine the reasonableness of the dis-
charged attorney's fee." More importantly, the Fracasse court be-
lieved that an immediate cause of action would place a coercive
burden on the contingency fee client, who is likely to be of limited
means, to pay his former attorney before final determination of the
litigation." ,1
In Rosenberg, the supreme court found the rule and rationale of
the California position convincing. The court considered the de-
ferred cause of action approach to be consistent with its objective
of promoting the client's ability to terminate the attorney-client
relationship.' 7 The harm to the discharged attorney from a de-
ferred cause of action was regarded as negligible because the attor-
ney would not have benefited prior to the contingency even under
the terms of the discharged contract.' 8 The court attempted to
minimize the alteration of contractual risk caused by the client's
choice of substitute counsel by utilizing a presumption of compe-
tency in the performance of the successor attorney. 9"
Prior to the supreme court's decision in Rosenberg, two district
courts in Florida which had considered the accrual question re-
garding contingency agreements came to opposite conclusions.100
90. Sohn v. Brockington, 371 So. 2d at 1094.
91. 181 N.E. at 75.
92. Note, supra note 18, at 791-92.
93. Id. at 791.
94. 181 N.E. at 76.
95. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
96. Id.
97. 7 Fla. L.W. at 8.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Sohn v. Brockington, 371 So. 2d at 1094 (favored an immediate cause of action); 610
Lincoln Road, Inc. v. Milton Kelner, P.A., 289 So. 2d at 15 (deferred cause of action).
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Like the supreme court, the third district considered the deferred
cause of action to be the better rule.'01 The first district, on the
other hand, considered the California rule inflexible and instead
opted for the New York rule.10 2
In New York, a discharged attorney has an immediate right to
quantum meruit recovery without regard for the fate of the contin-
gency.108 However, if the court considers the outcome of the litiga-
tion to be essential to determining the succeeded attorney's com-
pensation, it may grant a declaratory judgment, but defer payment
until the client obtains a favorable recovery.'" The discharged law-
yer also may elect to await the resolution of the matter and seek
quantum meruit recovery in an ancillary proceeding at the conclu-
sion of the case. 05 .
The Rosenberg opinion failed to consider the alternatives offered
by the New York procedure. The court considered the cause of ac-
tion issue to be an all or nothing proposition and assumed that an
immediate cause of action would place an improper burden on the
contingency fee client.'" Yet the New York rule is responsive to
the court's concern for determining the result obtained and
amount involved in order to correctly assess the amount of com-
pensation in appropriate cases. The lower courts should be en-
trusted to determine the proper moment for recovery and ade-
quately protect the interests of the discharged attorney and the
client. The supreme court instead adopted a rule based upon a hy-
pothetical contingency fee client of limited means.10 7 However,
"[tihe use of contingent fee contracts remains more an aspect of
the litigation involved than of the financial condition of a
client."108
The underlying litigation which gave rise to the claim for attor-
ney's fees in Rosenberg was a mortgage foreclosure action involving
101. Id. at 15.
102. 371 So. 2d at 1094.
103. Tillman v. Komar, 181 N.E. 75 (N.Y. 1932); Application of Krooks, 178 N.E. 548
(N.Y. 1931); Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46. Some other jurisdictions permit an immediate
cause of action. See, e.g., Watson v. Columbia Min. Co., 45 S.E. 460 (Ga. 1903); Cox v.
Trousdale, 27 P.2d 298 (Kan. 1933); Wright v. Johanson, 233 P. 16.
104. E.g., Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Shattuck
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 48 F.2d 346 (W.D.N.Y. 1931); Neithercut v. Ebanks, 421 N.Y.S.2d
919 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Friedman v. Gordon, 23 N.Y.S.2d 757 (2d Dep't 1940).
105. 305 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
106. 7 Fla. L.W. at 6.
107. Id.
108. Note, Fracasse v. Brent: Contingent Fee Compensation for an Attorney Dis-
charged Without Cause-A Right or A Mere Possibility? 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 355, 364 (1973).
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millions of dollars'0 9 and the court's assumption of a contingency
fee client of limited means was inappropriate on the facts before
the court.
Arguably, procedural safeguards designed to protect the dis-
charged attorney's recovery become more important under the de-
ferred cause of action approach. The courts traditionally have pro-
tected the discharged attorney's interest in an action by impressing
upon the client's ultimate recovery an equitable charging lien. 110
The supreme court has recognized the charging lien to be an ac-
ceptable method of securing the payment of attorney's fees."' Yet
the Rosenberg court did not consider the impact its adoption of
the California rule would have upon the use of charging liens in
contingency fee cases. Whether the preclusion of any immediate
legal action to recover the reasonable value of the discharged attor-
ney's services also precludes efforts to impose an equitable lien on
the client's future recovery is unanswered by the court's decision.
However, charging liens do not offend the objectives favored by the
Rosenberg court. The client is protected from incurring out-of-
pocket legal fees because the lien attaches only to a settlement or
judgment favorable to the client.11 2 Therefore, the client's power to
terminate the attorney-client relationship is not diminished be-
cause the fees are not due until the happening of the contingency.
If the contingency fails to occur, the attorney's lien is ineffective.,1
B. The Limited Quantum Meruit Rule
On rehearing, the Florida Supreme Court vacated its original de-
cision on the merits and adopted the "limited quantum meruit
rule" which restricts the recovery of a prematurely discharged at-
torney to the maximum fee provided for in the attorney-client con-
tract.' 1 4 The court considered this limitation logical in light of its
decision to establish quantum meruit as the exclusive remedy in
attorney discharge cases. 15 The limited quantum meruit rule rep-
resents a significant departure from the customary legal mind set
109. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2, Rosenberg v. Levin, 7 Fla. L.W. 6 (Jan. 6,
1982).
110. Fishback, Attorney's Liens for Fees, 51 FLA. B.J. 679 (Dec. 1977).
111. Winn v. City of Cocoa, 75 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1954). See also, Cruz v. Brown, 338 So.
2d 245 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Kurzweil v. Simon, 204 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Chancey v. Bauer, 97 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1938). But see Weksler v. Stamatinos,
314 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied 336 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1976).
112. Billingham v. Thiele, 107 So. 2d 238, 243 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
113. 97 F.2d 293.
114. 7 Fla. L.W. at 6.
115. Id. at 8.
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which is attuned to consider a restitutionary action, even in a con-
tractual setting, to be mutually exclusive from a contract action for
damages.116
In the majority of jurisdictions which follow the quantum meruit
rule or permit an action in quantum meruit to be brought as an
alternative to a contract action, the contract fee is not considered a
limitation on quantum meruit recovery. 117 The same rationale
which supports an immediate cause of action can be used to sup-
port an unlimited quantum meruit rule; the contract is rescinded
upon discharge and its terms no longer bind the attorney or the
client. Usually, the issue presented by a quantum meruit award in
excess of the contract does not arise because the reasonable value
of services performed under the prematurely terminated agree-
ment is less than the contract fee." s But in instances where unex-
pectedly difficult services are rendered or the attorney miscalcu-
lates the requirements of full performance, the client's exercise of
the power to discharge may in effect permit the attorney to escape
his obligations under a losing contract and in some instances may
result in a windfall to the discharged lawyer. "'
It is universally held that where the defendant's only remaining
obligation under a contract is to pay money and the plaintiff has
substantially or fully performed, restitution in quantum meruit is
precluded and the plaintiff is limited to recovery of the contract
fee, absent consequential damages.12 The supreme court followed
this principle in Milton Kelner, P.A.12 1 The court concluded Kel-
ner was entitled the full contingent fee because the contingency
116. See Palmer, The Contract Price as a Limit on Restitution for Defendant's Breach,
20 OHIO ST. L.J. 264, 273 (1959); Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 COLUM.
L. REv. 1208,'1215-19 (1973).
117. E.g., Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 410 N.E.2d 716 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) aff'd 426
N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1981): "[The client] cannot have it both ways. [He] cannot abrogate the
agreement on the high side and insist on its terms on the low side." Id. at 719. See also In
re Montgomery's Estate, 6 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1936) (rescinded contract cannot limit the attor-
ney's amount of recovery); see generally Annot. 109 A.L.R. 674 (1937) (contract price as
limit of attorney's recovery on quantum meruit in event of his discharge without fault on his
part).
118. Chambliss, Bahner & Crawford v. Luther, 531 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1975).
119. See, e.g., 6 N.E.2d 40 (attorney's recovery in quantum meruit was double that per-
mitted by the contract when discharged after performing five-sixths of the work); cf. Knapp
v. Gaston Teyssier, 96 Pa. Super. 193 (1929) (architect recovered $1,690 in quantum meruit
after part performance when payment in full would have been $490).
120. 531 S.W.2d at 110. See generally, 5 CORBIN, supra note 4, at § 1110 (2 ed. 1964)
(Restitution not available if performance has created a contract debt in money).
121. 328 So. 2d 193.
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had been achieved. 22 Paradoxically, an attorney discharged with-
out cause after partial performance in jurisdictions following the
unlimited quantum meruit approach can conceivably recover a
larger award than the attorney, similarly situated, who fully
performs. 1 3
The Rosenberg court's original decision quashed the district
court's limitation on the attorney's quantum meruit award to the
contract price. 12 Justice England reasoned that the attorney-client
contract was relevant to the determination of the reasonable com-
pensation owed the discharged lawyer, but its terms were not dis-
positive. 125 The court acknowledged the "chilling effect" that re-
covery in excess of the contract price could exert on the client's
power to discharge." 6 Nonetheless, the court reasoned that the
deleterious consequences of the unlimited quantum meruit rule
could be avoided by the trial court in ascertaining the reasonable
compensation owed the attorney.2 7 The court stated that quantum
meruit recovery in excess of the contract price would avoid "client
overreaching where the diligent attorney has outperformed the ini-
tial estimate of his worth . ."128 Other courts have similarly sug-
gested that unlimited quantum meruit recovery would prevent the
wholesale discharge of attorneys by clients shopping for the least
expensive legal fees.1'2
On rehearing, Justice Overton emphasized the economic penalty
the unlimited quantum meruit rule would levy upon a client exer-
cising his right to discharge.3 0 The court's earlier concern with the
possibility of client overreaching was replaced by a fear that the
rule would encourage less than ethical attorneys "to induce clients
to lose confidence in them in cases where the reasonable value of
their services has exceeded the original fee and thereby, upon be-
ing discharged, reap a greater benefit than that for which they had
122. Id. at 196; accord Oliver v. Campbell, 273 P.2d 15 (Cal. 1954) (attorney denied
$5000 recovery in quantum meruit and limited to contract price of $750 where attorney had
virtually completed performance).
123. Childres & Garamella, supra note 22, at 438.
124. 6 Fla. L.W. at 90.
125. Id. A number of cases suggest that although the contract does not govern or limit
quantum meruit recovery it should be taken into account in ascertaining an attorney's rea-
sonable compensation. See, e.g., Newman v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc. 443 F.2d 896 (5th Cir.
1971) (applying Mississippi law); Potts v. Mitchell, 410 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D.N.C. 1976).
126. 6 Fla. L.W. at 390.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Fracasse v. Brent, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90; Sohn v. Brockington, 371 So. 2d at 1093.
130. 7 Fla. L.W. at 8.
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bargained."'
The supreme court's adoption of the limited quantum meruit
rule was based exclusively upon the public policy objective of mak-
ing the power to discharge synonymous with the right to dis-
charge.132 This leaves the court's decision vulnerable to the attack
that it "jettisoned respected contract principles to decree . . . that
a solemn, valid agreement between attorney and client may be dis-
solved into thin air at the mere whim of the client."3 Some writ-
ers, however, have suggested that a departure from traditional con-
tract theory is warranted, and that a discharged attorney should
recover only to the extent of his reliance upon the contract.'"
This reliance interest can be articulated in two ways: in contract,
for the reasonable value of services rendered; or in quantum me-
ruit, a restitution action, also for the reasonable value of services
rendered. 35 Although the interest protected by the quantum me-
ruit and contract actions are the same, "in an action for reliance
damages on a losing contract, the contract price sets an upper limit
on recovery, while in a restitution action, the injured party's recov-
ery may sometimes exceed that price."' 6
Unfortunately, the Rosenberg court's adoption of the principle
that the right to discharge is implied in the contract fosters the
notion that the attorney's restitutionary recovery is not limited by
the terms of the contract. In this context, however, restitution for
breach is a contractual remedy13 7 and it is appropriate that the at-
torney's recovery for the reasonable value of services rendered
prior to discharge be limited to the contract price in a suit for
quantum meruit, just as it would in an action for contract dam-
ages.381 The 1979 tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts adopted this position and limited restitutionary recovery
for part performance to the amount which would have been due
upon completion of the contract." 9
131. Id. (quoting Chambliss, Bahner & Crawford v. Luther, 531 S.W.2d at 108, 113. See
5 CORBIN, supra note 4, at § 1102 (citing with approval the limited quantum meruit rule
adopted in Chambliss).
132. 7 Fla. L.W. at 8. "Without such a limitation, a client's right to discharge an attor-
ney may be illusory and the client may in effect be penalized for exercising a right." Id.
133. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
134. See, e.g., 5 CORBIN, supra note 131, at § 1102; Perillo, supra note 116, at 45; Chil-
dres & Garamella, supra note 22, at 451-54.
135. Childres & Garamella, supra note 22, at 437.
136. Perillo, supra note 116, at 42.
137. 5 CORBIN, supra note 4, at § 1102; 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 4.4
(1978); F. WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS § 260 (1913).
138. Childres & Garamella, supra note 22, at 452.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 387(2) (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1979). The final
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The limited quantum meruit rule recognizes that the protection
of one's reliance interest in a contract should not depend upon
whether the action is brought on the contract or in quantum me-
ruit and honors the parties' original allocation of risks. It avoids
the absurd result of an attorney being profitably compensated for
discharge from a losing contract and the "chilling effect" the con-
tract rule and the unlimited quantum meruit rule have upon the
client's power to terminate an unsatisfactory attorney-client
relationship.14
VI. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court's adoption of the limited quantum
meruit rule is a far-reaching attempt to unfetter the client's power
to discharge an unsatisfactory attorney. The uniform application of
the rule in all premature discharge cases coupled with the deferred
cause of action approach taken with respect to contingency fee
contracts, extends the rights of the client in Florida beyond those
recognized in any other jurisdiction.
Limiting the discharged attorney's recovery to the contract fee
avoids the paradox of restitution for part performance greater than
the sum which would have been due upon completion of the con-
tract, respects the parties' original bargain and promotes the cli-
ent's ability to retain counsel in whom he has confidence. Florida's
limited quantum meruit approach strikes the optimal balance be-
tween the client's right to discharge his attorney and the attorney's
right to reasonable compensation for work performed. The dis-
charged attorney's recovery, however, should not depend on the
performance of his successor. The court should have permitted an
immediate cause of action in contingency fee cases. In the limited
number of cases where the discharged attorney's contribution to
the outcome is essential to determine his recovery, his right to re-
cover could be protected by a declaratory judgment or charging
lien and recovery deferred until the conclusion of the controversy.
The Rosenberg decision will hopefully prompt other jurisdictions
to examine the inadequacies of the contract and unlimited quan-
tum meruit rules.
CRAIG B. GLIDDEN
draft retreated from this earlier position. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(2)
comment d. See generally, Perillo, supra note 110.
140. 7 Fla. L.W. at 8.
